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THE APPLICATION OF DODD-FRANK’S DUAL
PREEMPTION STANDARD TO STATE UDAP LAWS
Michael Bolos*
In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),1 a landmark
law designed to address the regulatory weaknesses that facilitated the
financial crisis. Dodd-Frank made several significant regulatory changes,
including an amendment to the National Bank Act (“NBA”).
This comment discusses the dual-preemption analysis created by
Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the NBA. Under the new dual-preemption
analysis, state laws that qualify as “state consumer financial laws” are
subject to a different preemption procedure than state laws that do not
qualify as state consumer financial laws. The comment focuses on several
issues that arise when determining whether the amended NBA preempts
state unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) laws. The main
conclusion reached through this analysis is that applying the new
preemption regime adds little clarity to the preemption debate, especially
with regard to state UDAP laws. In fact, it is the position of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) that, since 1996, the OCC has
adhered to the same standard as articulated in Dodd-Frank and, therefore,
only minor changes must be made to the OCC’s preemption regulations to
bring them into compliance with Dodd-Frank.2 If the OCC succeeds in
defending its position, the type and breadth of laws that can be preempted
will be unlikely to change. If so, the only alteration Dodd-Frank will make

* A special thank you to Kenneth Benton and all others whose insight and assistance
made this comment possible.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
2. See, e.g., Letter from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen.
Thomas R. Carper, SEC Interpretive Letter, 2011 WL 2110224 (May 12, 2011) (stating the
OCC’s intent to propose amendment of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 and regulations applicable to
federal savings associations and their subsidiaries, and rescission of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006).
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to the preemption debate will be the addition of more stringent procedures
to preempt state consumer financial laws.
Part I of this comment briefly reviews NBA preemption and the
OCC’s pre-Dodd-Frank rules for preemption. This section focuses on how
Barnett Bank and the OCC’s 2004 preemption rule became the basis for
assessing national bank preemption. Part II discusses Dodd-Frank’s
amendments to the NBA. Part III addresses unresolved issues with the
legislation, such as the definition of “state consumer financial law.” Part
IV analyzes national bank preemption of state UDAP laws. Part V
concludes by looking at the practical effect of Dodd-Frank on national bank
preemption.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIONAL BANK ACT PREEMPTION

For nearly 200 years, the United States has adhered to a dual banking
system composed of federally-chartered national banks and state-chartered
state banks.3 The supremacy of federal law over state law with respect to
national banking was clearly articulated in the landmark case of McCulloch
v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court held that “the government of the
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action.”4 Then, in 1864, Congress enacted the NBA, which granted
national banks enumerated powers and “all such incidental powers as shall
be necessary to carry on the business of banking . . .” 5 Since that time,
federal courts have defended the primacy of federal law, “repeatedly
ma[king] clear that federal control shields national banking from unduly
burdensome and duplicative state regulation.”6 The Supreme Court in
Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank clarified that, despite the primacy of federal
banking laws, national banks are still subject to state laws of general
application to the extent that such laws do not conflict with the letter or
general purposes of the NBA.7 In recent years, this has resulted in
numerous states attempting to apply their own laws to national banks, with
the intention of providing greater consumer protection for their citizens.8
3. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 677 (1988).
4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
5. National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008).
6. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007).
7. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 290 (1896) (stressing that the court’s
holding does not neutralize state laws that regulate national banks’ contracts, as long as
those statutes do not collide with federal legislation).
8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-387, OCC PREEMPTION RULES:
OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS 12 (2006) (examining the impact of consumer protection and
dual dual banking system rules) [hereinafter GAO-06-387].
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“It is upon the foundation of the dual banking system and the struggle
between states and the Federal government to regulate national banks that
U.S. preemption rules have developed.” This section discusses the OCC’s
pre-Dodd-Frank rules regarding preemption of state laws. Part A addresses
the OCC’s general preemption authority, focusing on Barnett Bank and the
OCC’s 2004 preemption rule. Part B discusses the OCC preemption with
regard to state UDAP laws.
A.

The OCC’s Application of National Bank Act Preemption

Over the years, the OCC has asserted its preemption authority with
increased vigor. As the regulatory agency charged with administering the
NBA, the OCC’s official interpretations of the Act receive Chevron
deference.9 Two significant recent events that have shaped OCC
preemption are the ruling in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), and the OCC’s 2004 preemption rule.
Barnett Bank established the standards for assessing preemption of
state laws. An oft-cited standard from Barnett Bank requires that a state
law cannot “prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s
exercise of its powers.”10 The Court reasoned that “Congress would not
want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that
Congress explicitly granted.”11 The holding in Barnett Bank “reflect[ed]
the Court’s view that the national banking laws do not create field
preemption.”12 Thus, the decision reserved for the States the power to
adopt laws that do not “significantly interfere” with national bank powers.13
In 2004, the OCC used the Barnett Bank language as the foundation to
create its 2004 preemption rule (“2004 Rule”).14 The 2004 rule sought to
enable national banks to “operate to the full extent of their powers under
federal law, without interference from inconsistent state laws, consistent
with the national character of the national banking system . . . .”15 Under
9. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2730 (2009) (noting that
Chevron, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
gives an agency the discretion to interpret an ambiguously-worded statute differently than a
court would, “within the limits of reason”).
10. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
11. Id.
12. Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 1001
(2006).
13. Joseph R. Mason, Robert Kulick & Hal J. Singer, The Economic Impact of
Eliminating Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 781, 786
(2010).
14. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1910 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000).
15. Id. at 1908.
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the 2004 Rule, the OCC would preempt state laws that “obstruct, impair, or
condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise” its federally granted
powers.16 The OCC standard became a concern for consumer groups, state
attorneys general, some members of Congress, and others opposed to
national bank preemption because, whereas Barnett Bank called for the
preemption of state laws that “impair significantly” a federal grant of
power,17 the OCC’s standard removed the word “significantly” and
replaced it with de facto field preemption.18 This appears to permit
preemption of a state law that impairs federally granted powers to any
degree.19 Reflecting this concern, in 2004, the House Financial Services
Committee passed a budget resolution stating that the OCC’s 2004 Rule
“may represent an unprecedented expansion of Federal preemption
authority.”20
In addition to codifying Barnett Bank, the OCC sought to codify other
recent judicial decisions and OCC opinions regarding the preemption of
specific categories of state law.21 For example, state laws relating to
lending disclosure, checking accounts, mortgage origination, and
mortgage-related activities are preempted under the 2004 Rule.22 However,
despite its attempt to clarify the OCC’s position on preemption, the 2004
Rule left many uncertainties about the applicability of state laws to national
banks.23
Nonetheless, recent cases have relied on the 2004 Rule when making
preemption determinations. For example, in Rose v. Chase Bank USA,
N.A., the Ninth Circuit relied on the OCC’s 2004 Rule in finding that
plaintiffs’ class action against Chase Bank was preempted by the NBA.24
The complaint alleged that Chase violated California Civil Code section
16. Id. at 1904, 1911–13.
17. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
18. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing assorted
strains of federal preemption that invalidate states’ exercise of their regulatory authority).
19. Richard H. Neiman, Managing Preemption and Oversight in a Modernized Dual
Banking System, 94 Banking Rep. (BNA) 3 (May 18, 2010); Fisher, supra note 12.
20. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 108TH CONG., VIEWS AND ESTIMATES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES ON MATTERS TO BE SET FORTH IN THE CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 15–16 (Comm. Print 2004).
21. Jeremy T. Rosenblum, Dodd-Frank Reform Act: A Sea Change Regarding Federal
Preemption of State Law, 14 CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP. 9 (2010); GAO-06-387, supra
note 8.
22. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 1904.
23. GAO-06-387, supra note 8, at 11.
24. Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on the
holdings of Barnett Bank and Franklin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347
U.S. 373 (1954), to conclude that the NBA preempts Cal. Civ. Code § 1748.9, and affirming
the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200–
17209).
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1748.9 by not including the disclosures required under the Code when
mailing convenience checks to its credit card holders.25 In addition to
alleging a violation of section 1748.9, plaintiffs also brought two causes of
action for violation of California’s UDAP law.26 Relying in part on the
2004 Rule, the Ninth Circuit held that all three claims were preempted by
the NBA.27
However, despite the fears and occasional court decisions, such
preemption determinations did not widely proliferate after the OCC issued
its 2004 Rule. This is in part because the OCC is subject to certain
procedural requirements under the NBA when issuing preemption
determinations, in addition to the ones that apply to all federal agencies
under the Administrative Procedure Act.28 Under 12 U.S.C. § 43, the OCC
must provide a notice and comment period before issuing any opinion letter
or interpretive rule that concludes that a federal law preempts the
application of a state law to a national bank.29
B.

UDAP PREEMPTION

Preemption of state UDAP laws has been a difficult issue, with the
OCC supporting preemption at times and the courts denying preemption at
other times.30 In 2002, the OCC issued an advisory letter that seemed to
support the applicability of state UDAP laws to national banks. The letter,
entitled “Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices,” advised that
“[t]he consequences of engaging in practices that may be unfair or
deceptive under federal or state law can include litigation, enforcement
actions, monetary judgments, and harm to the institution’s reputation.”31
The letter went on to say that “[a] number of state laws prohibit unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, and such laws may be applicable to insured
depository institutions.”32 Two years later, the OCC sought to clarify the
25. Id. at 1035.
26. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2010).
27. Rose, 513 F.3d at 1038.
28. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–504, 551–559, 561–570a, 571–584, 591–596 (2000).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1994).
30. See, e.g., Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the NBA did not preempt claims against Wachovia Bank for allegedly
manipulating the posting of transactions to impose overdraft fees); Mann v. TD Bank, N.A.,
No. 09-1062, 2009 WL 3818128 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2009) (holding that the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act applied to TD Bank); White v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 563 F. Supp. 2d
1358 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act for unfair or
deceptive business practices by manipulating the posting of transactions to impose overdraft
fees was not preempted).
31. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2002-3,
GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES (2002).
32. Id. at n.2.
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applicability of state laws in its 2004 rule.33 Despite the OCC’s best
efforts, preemption of state UDAP laws remained unclear. A 2006
investigation by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found:
differing views among state officials with respect to the
applicability of state consumer protection laws, particularly their
UDAP laws, to national banks. . . . In one state, a banking
department official said that the state’s UDAP statute would
likely be preempted. In another state, an official said that the
state’s UDAP statute would not be preempted. Two other state
banking department officials were unclear about the status of
their states’ UDAP laws.34
Ambiguity regarding the applicability of a state law can pose a
significant problem for all parties. National banks must know which laws
they are subject to so they can design appropriate compliance programs.
Additionally, state legislators and attorneys general must know the limits of
their authority so they do not expend precious government resources
enacting laws or pursuing cases that will ultimately be preempted.
In the absence of sufficient agency guidance, scholars and courts have
developed their own analytical framework for determining whether state
UDAP laws should be preempted.35 One interpretation of the rules uses a
two-step approach to analyze whether a state law is susceptible to
preemption by the National Bank Act.36
First, the court decides whether the state statute qualifies as a “lending
regulation.”37 This inquiry looks to whether: (i) the type of law is listed
among the types of preempted state laws under the OCC lending
preemption rule; (ii) the state law pertains to a subject matter that the
governing agency regulates, such as permissible terms, lending practices
and disclosures; or (iii) the object of the state law is to regulate the
relationship between the institution and the borrower.38
Second, the state law qualifies as a lending regulation, it is can be
preempted unless it is listed among certain non-preempted state laws (e.g.,
contract, tort, criminal) and has only an incidental effect on the operations
of national banks.39 If the state law does not qualify as a lending
regulation, then the court will look at whether the state law is of general
application and non-discriminatory towards a national bank.40 If the state
33. GAO-06-387, supra note 8, at 11.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Jeffrey I. Langer, UDAP Preemption for National Banks: The Skies are Cloudy, 12
CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP. 17 (2009).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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law meets these criteria, then it will not be preempted unless it has more
than an incidental effect on the operations of national banks.41
Despite these attempts, no universally accepted method for
determining preemption under the National Bank Act has emerged. Given
the breadth of state UDAP laws and the case-by-case analysis that must be
undertaken, it is clear why the Government Accountability Office
recommended that the OCC try yet again to “clarify the characteristics of
state consumer protection laws that would make them subject to federal
preemption” and to find a way to “improve communication and
coordination between OCC and state officials with respect to the impact of
preemption rules . . . .”42
II.

DODD-FRANK PREEMPTION

A.

The Text

The following section takes an in-depth look at section 1044 of DoddFrank. A careful examination of the text and the drafters’ intention
provides a better understanding of the Act’s dual preemption framework.
In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress sought to address the
regulatory lapses that enabled the subprime and predatory lending practices
that contributed to the financial crisis. Federal preemption of state laws as
they apply to national banks was among the issues Congress thought
needed clarification in order to ensure the financial stability of the U.S.
economy. To clarify preemption, Congress enacted Section 1044 of DoddFrank to amend the NBA. Section 1044 sets forth a framework for
analyzing NBA preemption as well as procedural requirements for the
OCC to follow when issuing preemption determinations.
Although Dodd-Frank claims to return preemption to Barnett Bank,43
it must be noted that the new, Barnett Bank-based preemption standard
only applies to laws that qualify as “state consumer financial laws.” As
U.S. Representative Melissa Bean explained:
I removed a sentence, previously suggested by the Committee
that said national banks are to generally comply with State law . .
. . because I wanted to make clear that the changes in the Act do
not alter the preemption standards and precedents that apply to

41. Id.
42. GAO-06-387, supra note 8, at 44–45.
43. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Johnson) (“it is clear that this legislation is codifying the preemption standard expressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson Florida Insurance
Commissioner, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) case”).
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those State laws which are not State consumer financial laws.44
Thus, the first step in any preemption analysis is determining whether
the state law qualifies as a “state consumer financial law.” A state law will
qualify as a state consumer financial law if it: (1) “does not directly or
indirectly discriminate against national banks” and (2) “directly and
specifically regulates the manner, content, or terms and conditions of any
financial transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage
in), or any account related thereto, with respect to a consumer.”45
If the state law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, then it may
be preempted if it: (1) has a discriminatory effect on national banks; (2) is
preempted by a Federal law other than the National Bank Act; or (3)
prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise of a national bank’s
powers.46
Preemption determinations made by the OCC regarding state
consumer financial laws must be made on a “case by case” basis and be
supported by “substantial evidence.”47 Preemption determinations may
relate to the laws of another state with substantively equivalent terms. All
preemption determinations must be made by the Comptroller of the
Currency and require consultation with the new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.48 Additionally, the OCC must review its preemption
determinations every five years.49
B.

The OCC’s Final Regulations

On July 20, 2011, the OCC issued its final rule implementing the
Dodd-Frank Act.50 With regard to the preemption standard, the OCC
revised its regulations to institute the procedural requirements cited above.
Also, in order to clarify that the OCC considers preemption under the
Barnett Bank decision, the final rule eliminates the “obstruct, impair, or
condition” language, leaving only a direct reference to “the decision of the
Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”51 It is important to note that the OCC
did not remove the section of the 2004 rule which lists categories of state
44. 155 CONG. REC. E3029-2 (daily ed. Dec 17, 2009) (statement of Rep. Bean).
45. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. News Release, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation,
Docket ID OCC-2011-0018 (July 20, 2011), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/newsreleases/2011/nr-occ-2011-95a.pdf.
51. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 34.3(b) (2011) (eliminating “obstruct,
impair, or condition” language).
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laws that do not apply to national bank’s lending and deposit-taking
activities.52
III. ISSUES COURTS & THE OCC WILL FACE
Dodd-Frank was drafted relatively quickly and was intended to cover
a broad array of areas. As frequently occurs with complex legislation,
Dodd-Frank contains many ambiguous provisions.
In the months
following the passage of Dodd-Frank, the OCC, Congressmen, and other
organizations and advocates sought to clarify key areas before the law took
effect in July, 2011. Although the OCC has released its final rule, the
debate will almost certainly spill over into the courtroom in the coming
years. This section will identify several key areas and explore strategies for
resolving the preemption ambiguities contained in the legislation.
A.

Defining “State Consumer Financial Law”

The dual-preemption regime created by Dodd-Frank hinges entirely
on whether a state law meets the criteria for a state consumer financial law.
If a state law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, then the OCC
must go through the analysis set forth in section 1044. However, if a state
law does not qualify as a state consumer financial law, then the OCC can
rely on its traditional analysis and prior determinations. Section 1044
broadly defines state consumer financial law as:
[A] State law that does not directly or indirectly discriminate
against national banks and that directly and specifically regulates
the manner, content, or terms and conditions of any financial
transaction (as may be authorized for national banks to engage
in), or any account related thereto with respect to a consumer.53
The main challenge for this analysis is the lack of legislative or
judicial history defining the term “state consumer financial law.” Earlier
versions of Dodd-Frank, Section 143 of the House Bill and Section 1043 of
the Senate Bill, both used the more common term, “state consumer law.”
However, by the final version, “state consumer law” was removed and
replaced with the new term “state consumer financial law.”54 As a result,
interpreters must rely solely on the language provided in Dodd-Frank to
create a workable definition of this term.
Two possible ways to unearth a working definition for the term state
consumer financial law are to: (1) compare the term to Dodd-Frank’s
52. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d) (2011).
53. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044.
54. H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009).
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definition of “federal consumer financial law”; and (2) break the term into
its component parts.
1. State Consumer Financial Laws & Federal Consumer Financial
Laws
One way to understand the term “state consumer financial law,” is to
look at it in context of the phrase “federal consumer financial law,” which
also appears in Title X of Dodd-Frank.55 Under principles of statutory
construction, it can be argued that a state law modeled after a federal law
defined under Title X as a “federal consumer financial law” would
logically qualify as a “state consumer financial law.” 56 Section 1002(14)
defines “federal consumer financial law” as:
the provisions of this title, the enumerated consumer laws, the
laws for which authorities are transferred under subtitles F and H,
and any rule or order prescribed by the Bureau under this title, an
enumerated consumer law, or pursuant to the authorities
transferred under subtitles F and H. The term does not include
the Federal Trade Commission Act.57
The definition of “enumerated consumer laws” contained in section
1002(12) lists a number of federal laws, including the Consumer Leasing
Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act, which would all qualify as federal consumer financial laws.58
One could argue that, since the federal laws listed in section 1002(12) are
defined in section 1002(14) as “federal consumer financial laws,” state
laws based on the laws in section 1002(12) should be defined as “state
consumer financial laws.” After all, the term “federal” does not modify or
alter the phrase “consumer financial law.”
2. State . . . Consumer . . . Financial . . . Law
In trying to understand the whole, it may be best to define the parts.
Title X of Dodd-Frank defines “state” as “any State, territory, or possession
of the United States . . . .”59 Although the broad definition of a state is
clear, Dodd-Frank leaves uncertain whether the smaller subdivisions of the
55. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14).
56. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501
(1998) (“similar language within the same statutory section must be accorded a consistent
meaning”).
57. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14).
58. Id. § 1002(12).
59. Id. § 1002(27).
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state are included for the purposes of defining the term “state consumer
financial law.” Black’s Law Dictionary, in referring to appealing criminal
cases, notes that the “term ‘state’ . . . is all inclusive and intended to include
not only the state but its political subdivisions, counties, and cities.”60 This
definition would allow county and city laws to qualify as state consumer
financial laws, requiring the OCC to undergo the more rigorous preemption
procedures articulated in Title X. This issue arose during the comments
process, where commentators “voiced concern that the imposition of an
overlay of 50 state and an indeterminate number of local government rules .
. . would have a costly consequence . . . .”61 However, those concerned
could argue that since numerous other sections in Dodd-Frank include the
language “of any State or of any political subdivision of a State,” the
omission of such language here is intentional.62
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in City of Columbus v.
Ours Garage and Wrecker.63 In the case, the Court discussed whether
municipalities could exercise the authority to issue safety regulations for
local towing truck operations when the law granted such authority to the
“authority of a State,” and omitted the language “or a political subdivision
of a State.”64 The Supreme Court found that the law did not bar states from
delegating to municipalities and other local units the state’s authority to
establish safety regulations.65 The court explained that “[a]bsent a clear
statement to the contrary, Congress’s reference to the ‘regulatory authority
of a State’ should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional
prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent
parts.”66 It would therefore appear that municipality and county laws may
be defined as “state laws.” If such laws were included in the definition,
then the OCC could be forced to make case-by-case determinations of
consumer financial laws not only from State legislatures, but from all
subdivisions within every state, territory, or possession of the United
States.
Title X of Dodd-Frank defines “consumer” as “an individual or an
agent, trustee, or representative acting on behalf of an individual.”67 This
definition implies that laws pertaining solely to transactions between banks
and other business entities cannot qualify as “state consumer financial
laws.”
60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (5th ed. 1979).
61. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION INTEGRATION, supra note 50.
62. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 619, 724, 731, 764 (using the language “of any State
or of any political subdivision of a State.”)
63. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker, 536 U.S. 424 (2002).
64. Id. at 428.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(4).
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The last two terms “financial” and “law” are best understood under the
definition of “state consumer financial law.” Section 1044 explains that the
words, taken together, are intended to cover laws that directly and
specifically regulate financial transactions and any account related
thereto.68 The only definition of “financial transaction” contained in DoddFrank is found in Title VIII.69 Title VIII defines financial transactions as:
(1) funds transfers; (2) securities contracts; (3) contracts of sale
of a commodity for future delivery; (4) forward contracts; (5)
repurchase agreements; (6) swaps; (7) security-based swaps; (8)
swap agreements; (9) security-based swap agreements; (10)
foreign exchange contracts; (11) financial derivatives contracts;
and (12) any similar transaction that the Council determines to be
a financial transaction for purposes of this title.70
The other phrase that requires careful analysis is the phrase “directly
and specifically.”71 Black’s Law defines “direct” as “[i]mmediate. . . .
[w]ithout any intervening medium, agency, or influence” and defines
“specifically” as “explicitly, particularly, [or] definitely.”72 The use of both
terms emphasizes Congress’s intent that only state laws that are explicitly
intended to regulate financial transactions will qualify as state consumer
financial laws. If Congress had intended a broader application, it would
have used the phrase “directly or indirectly,” as Congress chose to use in
describing discrimination against national banks.73
Putting these definitions together, it becomes clear that state consumer
financial laws must relate to individual consumers, not business entities,
and explicitly intend to regulate financial transactions or related accounts.
The terms, however, will be subjected to much closer scrutiny as courts are
forced to assess whether state laws qualify as state consumer financial
laws.
B.

Dodd-Frank’s Interpretation of Barnett Bank

The next issue that arises when analyzing preemption under DoddFrank is understanding exactly what the drafters intended when they
included the language “prevent or significantly interfere” in section 1044.
The Court in Barnett Bank used several phrases in explaining the types of
State laws that would be preempted by the National Bank Act.74 The Court
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. § 1044(a).
Id. § 801.
Id. § 803(7)(B).
Id. § 1044(a).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 459, 1398 (6th ed. 1990).
Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a).
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996).
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mentions preemption terms such as “irreconcilable conflict,”75 “stand as an
obstacle to,”76 “forbid, or to impair significantly”77 and “prevent or
significantly interfere.”78 Although the court refers three times to the
“stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment” language from Hines v.
Davidowitz,79 scholars and legislatures seem to have taken the phrase
“prevent or significantly interfere”80 as the standard for preemption, even
though the Court only refers to that phrase once in the entire opinion. In
1999, Congress used Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere”
language when drafting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999.81 As
with Dodd-Frank, the GLB Act specifically refers to Barnett Bank as the
primary case the Act sought to codify.
However, there is an obvious concern with taking a few words from a
decision and using it as the definitive legal standard. In a news release, the
American Bankers Insurance Association explained that Barnett Bank’s
“prevent or significantly interfere” language must be read in conjunction
with the entire decision, including the references to prior Supreme Court
decisions that use the “impair,” “hamper,” and “encroach” language. 82 The
fact that Dodd-Frank only quotes a specific standard from Barnett Bank
rather than the entire opinion leaves open the an argument that by solely
using the term “prevent or significantly interfere,” the drafters did not
intend to codify Barnett Bank but rather sought to create a new standard
that merely borrows language from Barnett Bank. This has been the
position taken by the State of New York Banking Department83 and the
Department of the Treasury.84
This argument is given further credence by the language in section
1044, which states that state consumer financial laws are preempted “in
accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of
[Barnett Bank]. . . .”85 The reference to the “legal standard” set forth in
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 33.
78. Id.
79. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 56 (1941).
80. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33.
81. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, § 104(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A).
82. News Release, American Bankers Insurance Association, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Preemption of State Insurance Sales Laws Applicable to Banks (June 4, 2002) (on file with
author).
83. Letter from Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendant of Financial Services and Acting
Superintendant of Banks, to John Walsh, Acting Comptroller (June 27, 2011)
(http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20110629bank/newyork.pdf).
84. Letter from George Madison, General Council at the Department of the Treasury, to
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller (June 27, 2011) (http://cdn.americanbanker.com/
media/pdfs/TreasuryOCC_062811.pdf).
85. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (emphasis
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Barnett Bank, versus the plural form “legal standards,” could show
legislative intent to draw out only the “prevent or significantly interfere”
language from the opinion. The argument becomes even stronger if the
Dodd-Frank language was based on section 104(d)(2)(A) of the GLBA Act,
which clearly states that the provision is to be interpreted “in accordance
with the legal standards for preemption set forth in [Barnett Bank].”86 The
alteration seems to imply that the language in Dodd-Frank was drafted with
specific intent to carve out the “prevent or significantly interfere” standard
from the rest of Barnett Bank.
The question of whether Dodd-Frank was intended to codify Barnett
Bank becomes clearer when looking to the debates and materials produced
during and after the drafting of the Act. A Senate Report released in April
10, 2010 clarified that under section 1044, “the standard for preempting
State consumer financial law would return to what it had been for decades,
those recognized by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25 (1996 Barnett), undoing broader standards adopted by rules, orders
and interpretations issued by the OCC in 2004.”87 Although this was an
attempt to clarify Title X’s adherence to the entirety of the Barnett Bank
decision, it suggests a grammatical error by first referring to a single
Barnett Bank “standard” and later using the pronoun “those,” implying
multiple standards.88
When discussing the Bill in the Senate floor debate on the HouseSenate Conference Committee Report, Senator Dodd, the Chairman of the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, stated that “[t]here
should be no doubt that the legislation codifies the preemption standard
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Barnett Bank].”89 Although this
statement, again, has the ambiguity of stating “standard” versus
“standards,” Senators Carper and Warner further clarified in a letter to
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner that both the legislation and
the colloquy on the Senate floor were intended to ensure the entirety of
Barnett Bank would be used when making preemption determinations.90
Given the conflicting positions taken on the issue, it is appropriate to
review case law for guidance. In Association of Banks in Insurance, Inc. v.
Duryee, the Sixth Circuit applied the “prevent or significantly interfere”
added).
86. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, § 104(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A)
(emphasis added).
87. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010).
88. Id.
89. 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02, (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (colloquy between Sen.
Thomas Carper and Chairman Christopher Dodd).
90. Letter from Senators Thomas Carper and Mark Warner to Timothy Geithner,
Secretary of the Treasury (July 8, 2011), http://www.politico.com/static/PPM170_110
707_treasurypreemption.html.
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language contained in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.91 Although the court
recognized that Barnett Bank set forth “legal standards for preemption,”92
the court focused on the two prong “prevent or significantly interfere”
standard.93 Nonetheless, in interpreting the language, the court considered
Barnett Bank’s reference to the decisions in McClellan v. Chipman,94 and
First National Bank v. Kentucky,95 which use the “impair the efficiency of,”
“destroy,” and “hamper,” language. The court used this understanding to
reject plaintiff’s argument that “prevent or significantly interfere” means
“effectively thwart.”96 Eight years after Duryee, the Sixth Circuit used the
same analysis in Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., holding that
“the level of ‘interference’ that gives rise to preemption under the NBA is
not very high.”97
The Eleventh Circuit has recently weighed in on the subject. In
Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s state law claims as preempted by
the NBA.98 Plaintiff argued that defendant violated a Florida statute that
specifically prohibited a bank from “settling any check drawn on it
otherwise than at par” when defendant charged plaintiff a $6.00 fee for
cashing a check.99 The court looked to the Barnett Bank decision as setting
the standard of conflict preemption.100 The court went on to state that “it is
clear that under the Dodd-Frank Act, the proper preemption test asks
whether there is a significant conflict between the state and federal statutes
. . .”101 By adhering to the conflict preemption standard, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to entertain the idea that Dodd-Frank did anything but
codify Barnett Bank.
Although the plain text of section 1044 does leave ambiguity as to
whether the section intended only to codify the “prevents or significantly
interferes with” language from Barnett Bank, the legislative history and
judicial background support the OCC’s conclusion that section 1044
intended to codify the entirety of the Barnett Bank decision. Further, the
case law supports the use of the phrase “prevent or significantly interfere”
and asserts that the language does not pose a very high hurdle for
preemption determinations.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Ass’n of Banks in Ins., Inc. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 409 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 405 n.4 (emphasis added).
Id. at 409–10.
McClellan v. Chipman Traders’ Nat’l Bank, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896).
First Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869).
Duryee, 270 F.3d at 409.
Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2009).
Baptista v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1197.
Id.
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Applicability of the OCC’s Prior Determinations

As discussed, the OCC has issued numerous preemption
determinations over the years, as well as official interpretations, including
the OCC’s 2004 Rule. The April 30, 2010 Senate Report stated that the
new preemption regime under Dodd-Frank was “undoing broader standards
adopted by rules, orders and interpretations issued by the OCC in 2004.”102
This raises the issue of what exactly becomes of the legislative and agency
history surrounding National Bank Act preemption.
Several areas of the law will not be altered by Title X and therefore,
prior OCC interpretations and court decisions will still apply. Since the
preemption standard created in Title X only applies to “state consumer
financial laws,” those laws that do not qualify as state consumer financial
laws will be subject to the preemption standards currently in place. As
mentioned in the prior section, since “consumer” is defined as an
individual, decisions regarding transactions between banks and other
business entities will not be affected.
According to the April 30, 2010 Senate Report, those laws that do
qualify as state consumer financial laws will be subject to a stricter
standard than has traditionally been applied. Despite the report’s language,
it is not readily apparent that a stricter standard has indeed been created.
Recall that Title X preempts any state law that: (1) has a discriminatory
effect on national banks; (2) is preempted by a federal law other than the
National Bank Act; or (3) prevents or significantly interferes with the
exercise of a national bank’s powers.103 The first prong will be analyzed in
the next subsection. The second prong has always been a clear case of
preemption. The third prong is, as discussed above, arguably a codification
of Barnett Bank, and would appear to be the basis for the Senate Report’s
conclusion that a stricter standard has been created.
However, the third prong does not seem to alter the OCC’s analysis in
the slightest. In the Federal Register notice for its 2004 Rule on
preemption authority, the OCC stated that it adopted the language
“obstruct, impair, or condition . . . . as the distillation of the various
preemption constructs articulated by the Supreme Court, as recognized in
Hines and Barnett Bank, and not as a replacement construct that is in any
way inconsistent with those standards.”104 In a 2003 letter from John
Hawke, the then Comptroller of the Currency, to Senator Sarbanes, Hawke
states that “[t]he OCC scrupulously follows [Barnett Bank] and other
applicable precedents when we evaluate a national bank preemption
102. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010).
103. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) .
104. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904-01, 1910 (Jan. 13, 2004).
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issue.”105 And then again in May of 2011, Acting Comptroller Walsh wrote
that “the conflict preemption principles of the Supreme Court’s Barnett
[Bank] decision are the governing standard for national bank
preemption.”106
In its final rule the OCC admitted that “the obstruct, impair, or
condition” language in the 2004 rule “created confusion and
misunderstanding,” and agreed to remove the language.107 Despite the
change, the OCC reaffirmed its position that, “the specific types of laws
cited in the [2004 rule] are consistent with the standard for conflict
preemption in the Supreme Court’s Barnett decision,” adding that further
requests to review the 2004 rule are inappropriate, because Dodd-Frank
only applies to determinations made after the Act’s effective date of July
21, 2011.108
In the OCC’s opinion, it has scrupulously adhered to Barnett Bank. If
this is truly the case, then all prior OCC determinations will survive judicial
review under the “new” three-prong standard and remain in place even if a
law qualifies as a state consumer financial law.109 In fact, the addition of
“discriminatory effect” as possible grounds for preemption would seem to
provide the OCC a broader standard than it has traditionally been working
under.
D.

What is “Discriminatory Effect”?

The decision in Title X to demarcate “discriminatory effect” as
grounds for preemption is significant. The language appears to be
borrowed from the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994, which gave the Comptroller of the Currency the

105. Letter from John Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Paul Sarbanes
(December 9, 2003), http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/SarbanesPreemption
letter.pdf.
106. Letter from John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Thomas R.
Carper,
(May
12,
2011)
(internal
quotations
omitted),
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents /may11/int1132.pdf.
107. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION INTEGRATION, supra note 50, at 26. In a footnote,
the OCC commented that the change should not affect prior preemption determinations
since no prior OCC-issued preemption precedent rested solely on the “obstruct, impair, or
condition” formulation. Id. at 43556 n.43. By including this explanation, the OCC seems to
implicitly acknowledge that there exists a difference between Barnett Bank and the OCC’s
formulation. If such a difference exists, then the OCC needs to look beyond preemption
determinations that rely solely on the “obstruct, impair, or condition” formulation, and
assess instances where the OCC’s formulation may have significantly influenced the
preemption determination.
108. Id. at 43558.
109. If and when the OCC’s determinations with regard to state consumer financial laws
are challenged and reviewed by a court, they will no longer be afforded Chevron deference.

BOLOS_FINALIZED_SIX (DO NOT DELETE)

306

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 14:1

authority to preempt state laws that have a discriminatory effect on national
bank branches.110 The use of this language in Title X now appears to
broaden that authority beyond just national bank branches.
The language not only appears to expand the OCC’s preemption
authority, but the addition may also create a redundancy in Dodd-Frank’s
preemption analysis. First, a law cannot qualify as a state consumer
financial law if it “directly or indirectly discriminate[s] against national
banks.”111 Then, if a state law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, it
will be preempted if it “has a discriminatory effect on national banks in
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by that State.”112
One would think that a state law that has a discriminatory effect on national
banks would never reach the Dodd-Frank preemption standards for state
consumer financial laws, because by discriminating against a national bank
the state law would not qualify as a state consumer financial law. This
would be a strong argument for the redundancy of the two standards.
However, it is well-established canon of statutory construction that a
statute should not be read in a way that makes any part of the statute
redundant.113 Differences in the language must be read to indicate
differences between the two standards. The key difference between the
two is that the first standard refers to “direct or indirect” discrimination,
whereas the second standard focuses on the “discriminatory effect” of the
state law. However, this does not help the analysis. The first standard
seems to cast a wider net than the second. Whereas the second standard
only looks to discriminatory effects against national banks, the first
standard seems to allow the OCC to look at direct and indirect
discrimination, including discriminatory effects as they relate to state banks
and any other competing financial institutions.
One way to reconcile this issue is to analogize the two standards to the
employment discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.114 Under Title VII, a plaintiff can make a prima facie case that
employment discrimination has occurred by showing either disparate
treatment or disparate impact.115 Disparate treatment occurs when there is
deliberate discrimination (i.e. discriminatory intent).116 Disparate impact
110. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §
36(f)(1)(A)(ii).
111. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (reaffirming the “cardinal
principle” that statutes should be read to be construed “so no clause, sentence, or word shall
be superfluous, void, or insignificant”).
114. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
116. See Lewis v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2010) (“For disparate-treatment
claims . . . plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate discrimination within the limitations
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covers “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities.”117 The Supreme Court in
Lewis v. City of Chicago explained that, although the terms seem similar,
“[t]he effect of applying Title VII’s text is that some claims that would be
doomed under one theory will survive under the other. . . .”118
Applying this framework to Dodd-Frank, one can analogize the
“directly or indirectly discriminates” language in Dodd-Frank to Title VII’s
disparate treatment. Under this logic, a law that deliberately discriminates
against national banks would not qualify as a state consumer financial law.
This would leave the second Dodd-Frank standard regarding the
“discriminatory effect” of a state law to be applied in a similar way as Title
VII’s disparate impact. Thus, a law that may have no discriminatory intent
may still be preempted because the law has a disproportionately adverse
effect on national banks in comparison to state banks.
Interpreting Dodd-Frank in this manner eliminates the seeming
redundancy in the law.119 The first standard would be used specifically to
analyze whether a law qualifies as a state consumer financial law will have
a specific application and prevent laws that have discriminatory intent from
qualifying as state consumer financial laws. Then, should a law qualify as
a state consumer financial law, the OCC and the courts will judge it under
the broader second standard of “discriminatory effect” by looking beyond
the intent of the law and assessing its impact on national banks.
IV. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS FOR STATE UDAP LAWS
As previously discussed, state UDAP laws have had a long, confused
history of preemption. This Section of the comment will build off of the
understanding of “state consumer financial” law created in Section III, the
other interpretations proposed in Section III, and the language of section
1044 to assess what preemption framework state UDAP laws may be
analyzed under, and whether, under that framework, state UDAP laws will
be preempted.
A.

Congressional Intent

A unique issue arises with the applicability of state UDAP laws. In
early versions of the Dodd-Frank Act (which in the House was called the
period.”).
117. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009).
118. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199.
119. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will
avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.” (citing United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955))).
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Consumer Financial Protection Commission Act, H.R. 3126), section 143
of the House Bill amended the National Bank Act to read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law and except as
provided in subsection (d), any consumer protection provision in
State consumer laws of general application, including any law
relating to unfair or deceptive acts or practices, any consumer
fraud law and repossession, foreclosure, and collection law, shall
apply to any national bank.120
However, after December 9, 2009, the term “state consumer law” was
scrapped for the term “state consumer financial law,” and the language
relating to state UDAP laws was removed. The implications of the removal
of the reference is open to interpretation. One interpretation may be that
the consideration and removal of the UDAP language shows intent by
Congress to preempt state UDAP laws. According to the Congressional
Research Service, courts may attribute significance to the fact that
Congress considered and rejected bill language that would have adopted
the very position at issue.121
Under this interpretation, the fact that Congress initially included state
UDAP laws and then removed the language could show Congressional
intent to preempt such laws. However, previous cases that advanced such
an argument were bolstered by further evidence from Congress regarding
why the language was removed. For example, in Pacific Gas and Electric
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission
the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 preempted a state statute conditioning the construction of nuclear
power plants on a finding of adequate means of disposal of nuclear
waste.122 In deciding the issue, the Court looked to the federal legislation,
particularly the decision of the House not to adopt an amendment requiring
nuclear power plants to have facilities for disposal of spent fuel and highlevel nuclear waste.123 After rejecting the amendment, Rep. Ottinger stated
that the language was deleted “to insure that there be no preemption.”124
Considering this information, the court found that “[w]hile we are correctly
reluctant to draw inferences from the failure of Congress to act, it would, in
this case, appear improper for us to give a reading to the Act that Congress
considered and rejected.”125
120. H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 143 (2009) (emphasis added).
121. YULE KIM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 42 (2008).
122. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 194–95 (1983).
123. Id. at 220.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Unfortunately, in the case of state UDAP preemption, the legislative
history is insufficient to determine why Congress removed the reference to
state UDAP laws. One alternative interpretation may simply be that
Congress thought the term state consumer financial law clearly
encompassed state UDAP laws and therefore the addition of the language
would be redundant. Without further insight into Congress’s intent, the
argument that Congress showed its desire to preempt state UDAP laws by
changing the language of the statute would probably be rejected by a
reviewing court.
B.

Preemption Analysis for State UDAP

Without statutory language indicating Congressional intent, state
UDAP laws are probably subject to the dual preemption framework
reserved for all other state laws. As discussed, the two main steps in the
dual preemption analysis are: (1) discovering whether the state UDAP law
qualifies as a “state consumer financial law” and then, based on the
outcome, (2) applying the appropriate preemption standards.
1. Does It Qualify As a “State Consumer Financial Law”?
The first step in the preemption analysis is to determine whether the
state UDAP law qualifies as a state consumer financial law. The previous
section discussed two methods for assessing whether a state law may
qualify as a state consumer financial law: (1) use of the term “federal
consumer financial law” as an indicator for what types of state laws are
“consumer financial laws”; and (2) use of the definition of state consumer
financial law provided in section 1044(a) as well as the definition of each
word.
Looking first at the definition of “federal consumer financial law,”
arguments can be made on both sides as to whether a state UDAP law
would qualify as a state consumer financial law. The first possible clue
comes in the section 1002(14) definition, which specifically says that the
Federal Trade Commission Act is not a federal consumer financial law.126
State UDAP laws are often based on Section 5(a) of FTC Act,127 and are
sometimes referred to as “mini-FTCs.”128 Thus, an argument can be made
that since the FTC does not qualify as a consumer financial law, mini-FTCs
should not qualify either.
126. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(14), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
127. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
128. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public
Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement,
24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 674 (2007-2008).
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However, §1002(14) is not the only part of the legislation that speaks
to the FTC Act. However, state mini-FTCs are based on section 5(a) of the
FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Section
1031 of Dodd-Frank specifically addresses federal UDAP law (i.e., §5(a) of
the FTC Act), charging the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
with the power to “prevent a covered person or service provider from
committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice
under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a
consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer
financial product or service.”129 Since §1011 and §1012 state that the
Bureau’s responsibility is to regulate federal consumer financial law, a
strong argument can be made that section 1031 (and therefore §5(a) of the
FTC Act) qualifies as a federal consumer financial law.130 Therefore, state
UDAP laws, which are based on §5(a) of the FTC Act, should qualify as
state consumer financial laws.
With the comparative analysis providing an unsatisfactory result, the
next method would be to breakdown section 1044’s definition of state
consumer financial law and look for clues. Section 1044(a) requires that a
state consumer financial law: (1) not directly or indirectly discriminate
against national banks and (2) specifically regulate the manner, content, or
terms and conditions of any financial transaction.131
Applying the understanding of “directly or indirectly discriminate”
developed in section III.D, a state UDAP law does not qualify as a state
consumer financial law if the intent of the law is to discriminate against
national banks.132 Given the broad applicability of state UDAP laws, it
would be surprising and unlikely to see a state UDAP law intentionally
discriminate against national banks. Thus, the first part of the state
consumer financial law definition need not be discussed further.
The second requirement is that the state UDAP law “directly and
specifically” regulate financial transactions. There is one additional
element to this definition implied by the statute. As discussed in the prior
section, the word “consumer” in the term “state consumer financial law”
implies that the law must regulate the transaction of individual consumers,
rather than corporate transactions. A large majority of state UDAP law
provisions cover individual transactions. Thus, the analysis hinges on
whether the law “directly and specifically regulate[s] the manner, content
or terms and conditions of any financial transaction. . . .” 133 One must
therefore show that state UDAP laws directly and specifically regulate
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Dodd-Frank Act § 1031.
Id. §§ 1011–12.
Id. § 1044(a).
Id.
Id.
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financial transactions in order for them to qualify as state consumer
financial laws.
By prohibiting the terms of financial transactions from being unfair or
deceptive, state UDAP laws arguably regulate the manner, content, and
terms of financial transactions. A state UDAP law’s ability to directly and
specifically regulate a transaction is not altered merely because it covers a
broad category of transactions.
However, commentators have called into question the extent to which
state UDAP laws of general application can directly and specifically
regulate financial transactions or accounts.134 As discussed in Section III,
the combination of the terms “directly” and “specifically” connotes a clear
desire that a state law must expressly intend to cover consumer financial
transactions in order to qualify as a state consumer financial law. Barnett
Bank provides insight into analyzing the term “specifically.” In deciding
whether a federal statute specifically related to the business of insurance,
the Supreme Court explained that although “the general words ‘business
activity,’ for example, will sometimes include, and thereby implicitly refer,
to insurance; the particular words ‘finance, banking, and insurance’ make
the reference explicitly and specifically.”135 The Court further clarified that
“[m]any federal statutes with potentially pre-emptive effect . . . use general
language that does not appear to ‘specifically relate’ to insurance . . . .”136
Applying Barnett Bank’s understanding of “specifically relates,” generally
applicable state laws could not satisfy the less stringent “specifically
relates” standard, let alone the arguably more stringent “directly and
specifically regulates” standard contained in Title X.
State UDAP laws of general applicability would probably not have
clear enough intent to regulate consumer financial transactions and would
therefore be subject to the current preemption regime.
2. If the Law Qualifies as a State Consumer Financial Law, Is It
Preempted Under the Three Prong Dodd-Frank Test?
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that state UDAP laws do indeed
qualify as state consumer financial laws, then preemption is determined by
the three-prong test set forth in section 1044 of Dodd-Frank. Under the
Dodd-Frank test, a state consumer financial law may be preempted if it:
(1) has a discriminatory effect on national banks; (2) is preempted by a
federal law other than certain portions of the NBA; or (3) prevents or
significantly interferes with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.137
134.
135.
136.
137.

Rosenblum, supra note 21, at 3–4.
Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996).
Id. at 42.
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1044(b)(1)(A)–(C).
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Under the first prong of the Dodd-Frank test, the state consumer
financial law cannot have a discriminatory effect on national banks.138
Following the proposed analysis discussed in Section III, to have a
discriminatory effect (i.e., disparate impact), a state UDAP law need only
disproportionately impact national banks as compared to state banks. State
UDAP laws broadly apply to a number of transactions, including those
conducted by state banks.139 Therefore, most state UDAP laws could not
be said to have a discriminatory effect on national banks.
Under the second prong, the state law must not be preempted by a
federal law other than Title 62 of the Revised Statutes, commonly known
as the NBA.140 Although section 5 of the FTC Act covers unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, nothing in the law specifically preempts state
UDAP laws. However, several laws outside of section 5 may preempt a
state UDAP law. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,141 the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,142 and even parts of the NBA outside of Title
62143 contain regulations that could preempt an overreaching state UDAP
law. Therefore, a broad review of relevant federal laws is required to
satisfy the third prong.
Under the third prong, the state law must comply with the legal
standard set forth in Barnett Bank, in that the state law cannot prevent or
significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.144 As
discussed, state legislatures typically model UDAP laws after Section 5 of
the FTC Act, although they may contain additions, such as a private right
of action. State UDAP laws generally do not forbid activities authorized by
federal statute, because federal statutes, namely §5 of the FTC Act, forbid
much of the same conduct.145 The OCC’s 2002 advisory letter bolsters this
argument with its statement that national banks may be subject to state
UDAP laws.146 If the OCC has indeed been working under the framework
of Barnett Bank and applicable case law, then most state UDAP laws
would not be preempted by prong three. However, since Barnett Bank
remains the standard under Dodd-Frank, the debate surrounding the
138. Id.
139. See, e.g. CAROLYN CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER INC., CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (2009) (discussing how consumer issues surrounding mortgages and
lending can be brought under state UDAP statutes).
140. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1044(b)(1)(A)–(C).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006).
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6701–6781 (2000).
143. 12 U.S.C. §§ 38, 92a, 371 (2006).
144. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044.
145. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A., v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (discussing
explicit and conflict preemption).
146. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2002-3,
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, at 1 (2002).
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preemption of state UDAP laws remains as uncertain as it did pre-DoddFrank.
It is worth noting that since the first prong (i.e., discriminatory effect)
is rarely at issue, it is of little importance whether state UDAP laws qualify
as state consumer financial laws. Whether or not the law qualifies as a
state consumer financial rule, the law would still be subject to preemption
by other federal laws (prong two) as well as preemption under the standard
set forth in Barnett Bank (prong three). Unless the OCC or the courts
determine that the first prong has a more inclusive interpretation, it is
largely irrelevant whether a state law qualifies as a state consumer financial
law.
CONCLUSION
The amendments to the NBA codified in section 1044 of Dodd-Frank
have added a new set of procedures for OCC preemption determinations.
This comment sought to shed light on those procedures and any substantive
changes the amendments might have made to the preemption analysis.
Section I summarized the pre-Dodd-Frank standards for OCC
preemption. In the coming years, the OCC will surely face scrutiny
regarding its adherence to Barnett Bank and other standards. In the preDodd-Frank era, state UDAP laws’ applicability to national banks was
unclear.
Section II addressed the text of Dodd-Frank and the new procedures
required for laws that qualify as state consumer financial laws. Section III
then identified several parts of the law that will likely come under close
scrutiny in the future. The issues surrounding (1) the definition of the new
term “state consumer financial law,” (2) Dodd-Frank’s interpretation of
Barnett Bank, (3) the applicability of the OCC’s prior regulations, and (4)
the application of the “discriminatory effect” language, are significant and
can substantively alter the preemption analysis.
Based on this comment’s assessment of these issues, Dodd-Frank does
little to change preemption in a substantive manner.147 Whether or not a
law qualifies as a state consumer financial law, the standard for preemption
remains the standard that was used in Barnett Bank. Additionally, whether
or not the rule qualifies as a state consumer financial law, it is still subject
to preemption by other federal laws outside of Title 62 of the Revised
Statutes. The wild card in the preemption debate is the manner in which
147. Section 1044 does provide a number of new procedural requirements when
preempting a law that qualifies as a state consumer financial law. The OCC must make
preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis, consult with the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection before preempting state consumer financial laws, and review all
preemption determinations every five years. Dodd Frank Act §§ 1044(b)–(d).
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the OCC and the courts will interpret the “indirect or direct discrimination”
and “discriminatory effect” language to avoid redundancy in the law.
Section IV used the insight from the prior sections to understand how
state UDAP laws may be processed under Dodd-Frank. From the analysis,
many state UDAP laws are too broad to “directly and specifically regulate”
consumer financial transactions and would therefore not qualify as state
consumer financial laws. This would place state UDAP laws outside the
new preemption procedures in Dodd-Frank, leaving state UDAP laws
subject to the same uncertain preemption regime in which they have
operated for years.
The new dual preemption standard is still in its infancy and the OCC
has just recently published its proposed final rule interpreting section
1044’s amendments to the NBA.148 Given the desires of the OCC to
maintain its preemption authority and state governments to enact their own
standards for institutions operating within their borders, it is certain that the
language contained in Section 1044 will soon be the subject of multiple
legal disputes. The intention of this article has been to provide a starting
point for the discussion of the changing landscape of national bank
preemption of state UDAP laws.

148. Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 140 (proposed May 26, 2011) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000(a)–(b)).
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